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Abstract 
Researchers generally have  assumed  that the impact  of multibank 
holding company  (MBHC)  affiliation on  subsidiary bank  efficiency would 
not vary across holding company  groups.  Several  writers have  argued  that 
this view  is incorrect and  may  explain the mixed  and  inconclusive 
findings on  affiliation-related efficiencies reported in  many  empirical 
studies.  In particular,  Fraas  has  suggested that differences in  MBHC 
organizational centralization may  cause' differences in subsidiary bank 
performance  and  that the failure to control for structural variation may 
bias estimates of affiliate-independent  bank  efficiency differentials 
toward  insignificance.  This study explores  the impact  of  MBHC 
organizational centralization on  subsidiary bank  efficiency,  using survey 
data on  holding company  structure and  a profit-function approach.  The 
evidence suggests  that differences in  MBHC  structure do  result in 
differences  in  affiliate efficiency. 
I.  Introduction 
Many  researchers have  explored the impact  of multibank  holding 
company  affiliation  on  bank  efficiency over  the past decade.  Most  of 
these researchers  have  focused exclusively on  operational or technical 
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allocative or price efficiency have typically been ignored.'  In 
general, the empirical evidence on affiliation-related efficiencies is 
mixed and  inconclusive. 
The methodological approach employed in  virtually all of these 
studies may be partially responsible for obscuring MBHC  impacts on 
subsidiary bank efficiency.  Typically, researchers have assumed that 
holding company organizations are homogeneous entities or, alternatively, 
that the impact of affiliation on subsidiary bank efficiency will not 
L  vary across holding company groups. 
A small group of writers have provided evidence indicating that 
this view may be incorrect; see, for example, Lawrence  (1971) and Fraas 
(1974).  In  particular, data obtained in five separate surveys have 
consistently shown that the degree of involvement of MBHC  parent 
corporations in  the decisions and operations of their subsidiary banks, 
or holding company organizational centralization, varies widely across 
companies.3  Fraas and others have suggested that these obvious 
differences in  MBHC  organizational central  ization might.  be responsible 
for differences in  subsidiary bank performance.  That is, subsidiary bank 
realization of potential affiliation-related economies  (real  or 
pecuniary) may require some degree of parent company centralization.  4 
Fraas hypothesizes that inter-company structural variation could result 
in  offsetting differences in  the performance of affiliates of individual 
holding companies, blurring subsidiary-independent bank performance 
differentials in  the typical empirical affiliation impact study.  5 
Thus, a re-examination of the MBHC  impact on  bank efficiency  (both 
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organizational centralization are explicitly taken into account, appears 
warranted and  is the subject of this study.  The study uses a 
profit-function approach, originally developed by  McFadden  (1966).  This 
framework permits hypotheses to be tested about differences in the 
relative economic efficiency of alternative organizational forms and 
allows evidence on economies of scale to be obtained. 
Mullineaux  (1978)  has been the only researcher to examine the 
efficiency of  holding company aff  i  1  iates re1  ative to independent banks 
using a profit-function framework.  Although he noted that differences in 
MBHC organizational centralization might affect subsidiary bank 
efficiency  (see  Mullineaux, p.  277), he lacked the structural data to 
test such a hypothesis and so treated all multibank holding company 
affiliates as elements of a single group.6  The study herein thus 
represents an  extension of his earlier work.  For this reason, 
Mullineaux's approach and  methods will  be utilized in this study to the 
extent possible. 
11.  Profit Functions for Commercial Banks 
The profit function expresses the maximized profit for a firm in  a 
competitive situation as a function of output and  variable input prices 
and  quantities of fixed  factor^.^  Differences in  economic efficiency 
across firms by definition are caused by  differences in technical and/or 
price efficiency. Such differences are reflected in the values of the 
actual  profit functions of firms, ceteris paribus, given competitive 
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re1  atively more  economic  efficient.  8 
The  profit-function approach  to studying efficiency  in banking  has 
a number  of  desirable properties.  First, the level  of  output  is not a 
variable in  the profit function.  Thus,  the difficulties involved in 
defining commercial  bank  output encountered when  a cost function  is 
estimated are avoided.  Second,  bank  cost studies relate solely to 
technical  efficiency,  while  the profit function entails the more  complete 
c~ticept  of  economic efficiency.  Finally,  given  a limited set of 
assumptions,  one  can  be  sure that a one-to-one correspondence exists 
between  the set of  concave  production  functions and  the set of  convex 
profit functions.  Thus,  the characteristics of  the production  function 
can  be  identified from  the parameters  of  the profit function,  which  is 
easier to estimate. 
To  estimate  the bank  profit function,  some  functional  form must  be 
postulated.9  To  facil  i tate comparison  with the resul ts reported 
earlier by  Mullineaux,  a profit-function specification similar to the one 
he  used  was  adopted.  Assuming  price-taking behavior  in all markets  by 
commercial  banks  and  a Cobb-Douglas production  technology,  the  profit 
function  has  the following  general  form: 10 
(1)  In -  PROF  =  a  + -pi  ln  Pi  +  );b.  In  w. + 
-0  -  -J  -J  Hsln&  ¶  -  -  -  -  - 
where 
PROF  =  short-run  profits,  - 
Pi(i =  1, 2)  =  the  n  output  prices,  -  -  - 
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Z  (k  =  1, tj  =  the auantities of the fixed factors.  -4 -  -  - 
If  output price data are available, the profit function can be used 
to test the assumption that firms are price takers in  particular 
markets.  Output prices do not appear in  a monopolist's profit 
function.''  Thus, for multi-product  firms such as commercial banks, a 
finding that some bank output prices make insignificant contributions to 
the empirical explanation of bank  profits is consistent with the 
hypothesis that banks are not price takers in  all markets.  Such a 
finding suggests that some variable reflecting the external structure of 
a bank's market be used in  the profit function in  place of some or all 
output prices. 
The test for superior economic efficiency revolves around the level 
of profit "predicted" from the profit function.  Lau and  Yotopoulos 
(1971)  have proven that, given Cobb-Douglas production conditions, 
differences in  technical efficiency and/or differences in  price 
efficiency translate into constant differences in  the level of profits, 
given market prices  (see  Lau and  Yotopoulos, pp.  101-03).  Consequently, 
tests for relative efficiency can be based on the significance of 
organizational dummy variables included in  an estimated profit function. 
Mullineaux classified each of his sample banks as either a one-bank 
holding company affiliate, a multibank holding company affiliate, or an 
independent bank. He then examined the economic efficiency of the two 
classes of subsidiary banks relative to independent banks. 
In the study herein, the sample consists entirely of MBHC affiliates 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyand  independent banks.  Following the approach originally used by 
Lawrence, the sample holding company banks were assigned to one of three 
structural classifications  (centralized, moderately centralized, 
decentralized) on the basis of detailed survey data concerning the 
operational policies of their respective parent corporations,.  Affiliates 
were placed in  the centralized category if the survey data indicated that 
the parent company was heavily involved in  the decisions and operations 
of  its constituent banks.  Subsidiary banks were classified as moderately 
centralized if their parent was somewhat less involved in their decisions 
and operations.  Affiliates were placed in  the decentralized category if 
their parent had very limited involvement in their decisions and 
operations.12  Roughly 19 percent of the sample affiliates were 
classified as centralized, 65 percent as moderately centralized, and 16 
percent as decentralized.  Thus, the aim of this study is to examine the 
relative economic efficiency of the three classes of alternatively 
structured MBHC affiliates and independent banks. 
111.  Estimation of the Commercial Bank Profit Function 
The data used (with  the exception of the organizational structure 
data) to estimate the profit function were obtained from the 1979 
year-end bank reports of income and condition.  The non-random sample 
consists of 1210 banks drawn from twelve states, equally divided between 
holding company affiliates and independent banks.13  The subsidiary 
bank portion of the sample consists of affiliates of 65 MBHCs that 
responded to a 1979 survey of their corporate operational policies.  14 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyThe sample was completed by  including a "comparable" independent bank for 
each MBHC subsidiary bank.  The average asset size for the entire sample 
of banks was approximately $68 mi 11  ion. 
The dependent variable, bank profits  (PROF),  is measured as pre-tax 
total operating revenue minus operating expenses net of occupancy 
costs.  l5  Occupancy costs are treated as fixed costs; fol  lowing 
McFadden, they are not included in  the measure of profit. 
The independent variables used in  the estimated bank-profit function 
are defined below.  Unfortunately, data availability limited the set of 
independent variables employed relative to the set used by Mullineaux. 
Ideally, output prices should appear as independent variables in the 
profit function so that the hypothesis of price-taking behavior can be 
tested.  However, it  is not possible to construct output-price variables 
similar to those used by Mullineaux using reports of income and condition 
data.  The lack of output-price data may not be problematic.  Mullineaux 
found that the estimated coefficients on the output price variables 
employed were generally insignificant or failed to conform to a priori 
expectations.  He tentatively concluded that these findings indicated 
noncompetitive behavior. Thus, he excluded all output price variables 
from the final form of the profit function he estimated and substituted a 
market-structure variable instead. 
Mullineaux used average salaries plus fringe benefits per employee 
as the price of labor in  his estimated profit equations.  The same 
variable  (WAGE)  is used in  this study.16  The sign of this variable 
should be negative. 
Mullineaux treated deposits as variable inputs in  his study and so 
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variables in  a preliminary version of the profit functions he  estimated. 
As  was  the case  with his output-price variables,  the estimated 
coefficients of the deposit yield terms had  unanticipated signs  and/or 
were  insignificant.  Mullineaux  likewise interpreted this to  be  evidence 
of non-competitive behavior;  thus,  these  variables were  dropped  from the 
final form of  the profit equation he  estimated.17  Because  similar 
findings were  obtained in  this study,  deposit-yield variables do  not 
appear  in  the profit function reported below. 
Following Mull  ineaux,  the number  of bank  offices  (OFF)  and  a proxy 
variable for office size (AVOFS),  defined as  the ratio of furniture and 
equipment  expenses  to the number  of  offices,  are used  to represent  the 
quantities of fixed factors in  the estimated profit function.  Additions 
to the number  of offices or to the size of  existing offices should 
increase bank  profits,  ceteris paribus. 
The  coefficients  of the fixed-factor variables provide insight on 
the existence of  economies  of scale.  In  particular,  if the sum  of the 
coefficients  of  the fixed-factor  variables equals one  in  the estimated 
profit equation,  one  can  conclude  that there are constant returns to 
scale in banking.18  If the sum  of the coefficients exceeds  one, 
increasing returns prevail.  A  sum  of less than one  indicates decreasing 
returns. 
Branching regulations limit the ability of  banks  in  unit banks  to 
operate at more  than one  location and  thus  affect  the marginal  return 
unit banks  can  earn on  full-service off  ices relative to  banks  in 
branching  states.  To  measure  this difference  in  marginal returns, 
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Mullineaux  includes two  interaction variables in  his estimated equation. 
The  variables are 
DUMl  =  Dl *  In  OFF, 
DUM2  =  D2  *  In  OFF, 
where 
Dl =  1 if a bank  is located in  a statewide branching state; 
otherwi  se,  0. 
an a 
D2  =  1 if a bank  is locatea in a limited branch  state;  otherwise,  0. 
Mullineaux  expects  the coefficients of both variables to be 
negative. l9  Indentical  variables are used  in  this study. 
Based  on  his analysis,  Mullineaux concluded that bank-output markets 
were  generally non-competitive and  so  included a market-structure 
variable (a "numbers  equivalent" market-structure measure)  in  his 
estimated equations.  He  founa  that tne coefficient of this measure  was 
significant and  had  the anticipated sign.  Given  these findings,  a 
market-structure variable was  included in the profit function estimated 
in  this study.  Because  a measure  like the one  used by Mullineaux was  not 
readily available,  a very crude market-structure variable was  employed. 
Specifically,  a dummy  variable (SMSADUM),  which takes on  a value of one 
if  a bank  was  headquartered  in  an  SMSA  or a value  of zero otherwise,  was 
used  as  a market-structure proxy.  Assuming  that urban banking markets 
are more  competitive than rural markets,  the coefficient of this variable 
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Mullineaux categorized his sample banks as independents, MBHC 
affiliates, or one-bank holding company affiliates.  He used two 
organizational dummies in  his profit equation to examine differences in 
bank efficiency, choosing independents as his reference group.  The 
coefficients on his two organizational dummies thus indicated whether a 
particular type of holding company subsidiary bank was relatively more 
economic efficient than independents. 
In this study, the sample consists of four groups:  centralized MBHC 
affiliates, moderately centralized affiliates, decentralized affiliates, 
and  independent banks.  The group of centralized affiliates was used as 
the reference group.  Thus, one dummy variable was used for each of the 
three latter groups  (MCDUM, DCDUM, and  IBDUM, respectively) in  the 
estimated profit equation.  The sign of the estimated coefficient on each 
dummy thus indicates whether that particular type of bank  is relatively 
more  (positive sign) or less  (negative sign) economic efficient than 
centralized holding company affiliates. 
IV.  Estimation Results 
The prof  it  eauation was estimated using ordinary least squares  (see 
the estimation in table I)."  Examination of the coefficients in table 
1  reveals that virtually all  of the non-organizational variables possess 
the anticipatea signs.  Only the coefficient on DUMl is not statistically 
significant.  The adjusted R'  for the equation is quite high, given 
that the analysis is cross sectional. 
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production function of commercial banks is characterized by  increasing 
returns to scale.  The measures of economies of scale derived from the 
estimated equation are 1.660 for banks in  unit banking states, 1.510 for 
banks in  limited branching states, and  1.541  for banks in  statewide 
branching states, all  of which are significantly greater than one.  These 
findings are similar to those reported by Mullineaux. 
The critically important coefficients in  this study are those on the 
three organizational form dummies.  The coefficients on both the IBDUM 
and DCDUM variables are negative and significant, indicating that 
centralized holding company affiliates are relatively more economic 
efficient tnan independent banks -  and subsidiary banks of decentralized 
holding companies."  The coefficient on the nCDUM variable is also 
negative but insignificant. 
These findings are not unreasonable.  Researchers writing on this 
subject have hypothesized that realization of significant 
affiliation-related economies may require that holding companies 
centralize decisions and operations to some undefined degree.  22  If 
this were indeed true, one would expect to discover insignificant 
differences in  efficiency between centralized and moderately centralized 
affiliates, while observing significant differences in  efficiency between 
relatively centralized affiliates and independent banks and  between 
centralized affiliates and relatively decentralized affiliates.  This 
last result is reasonable, since, by definition, affiliates of 
decentralized MBHCs operate with a great deal of autonomy, essentially as 
independent banks. 
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V.  Summary 
The results suggest that MBHC organizational structure affects the 
relative economic efficiency of subsidiary banks.  In particular, the 
results indicate that the subsidiaries of relatively centralized MBHCs 
are more efficient than independent banks -  and relatively decentralized 
holding company affiliates.  The significant efficiency difference 
detected between centralized and decentralized affiliates lends credence 
to the view voiced by Fraas; that is, it is inappropriate in empirical 
studies to consider all  holding company affiliates to be homogeneous 
elements of a single group. 
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Footnotes 
1.  The  exception  is  Mull  ineaux  (1978). 
2.  This assumption  is  reflected in  the use  of a single binary holding 
company  affil  iation dummy  in  the cost functions estimated. 
3.  See  also Weiss  (1969),  Jesser and Fisher  (1973),  Stodden  (1975)  and 
the Association of Bank  Holding Companies  (1978). 
4.  See  a1 so  Benston and Hanweck  (1977),  Longbrake  (1974),  Mull  ineaux 
(1978),  and Mayne  (1976).  The  study by  Mayne  represents  the only attempt 
to exanli  ne  empirical ly 1  inkages between MBHC  organizational 
central  ization and  subsidiary performance. 
5.  See  Fraas  (1974),  p.  1. 
6.  Actually,  Mu1 1  ineaux  did distinguish between mu1 tibank and one-bank 
holding company  affil  iates. 
7.  The  assumptions used in  deriving the profit function are: 
(1  )  firms are profit  maximizers, 
(2)  firms are price takers in  all markets, 
(3)  the production  function is  concave  in  the variable inputs. 
The  derived profit function is  non-negative,  convex,  increasing in  output 
prices,  decreasing in  input prices,  and  increasing in  the quantities of 
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fixed factors.  The  profit function  is also homogeneous  of  degree 1  in 
output and  input  prices. 
8.  In  certain cases it is possible to identify the source of  economic 
efficiency differences;  see Yotopoul os  and  Lau  (1973). 
9.  Because  of  the existence of  dual i ty re1  ationships,  one  can  simply 
specify a well-behaved  profit function and  be  sure that it  corresponds 
one-to-one  wit11 a concave  production  function. 
10.  Mullineaux  tested his Cobb-Douglas specification by  including 
squared and  cross-product labor price terms  in  his equations and  found 
that it  could  not  be  rejected.  In  this study a squared wage  term was 
used  in preliminary  ruris  and  was  found  to be  insignificant.  Thus,  a 
Cobb-Douglas functional  form  was  used  in this study. 
11.  For  a demonstration,  see Lau  (1969). 
12.  Specifically, survey  data were  used  to construct numerical  indexes 
designed  to proxy  the degree of  MBHC  organizational  centralization  in  11 
different subsidiary bank  operational  areas  for a sample  of  65  MBHCs. 
The  policy-area  indexes were  then  summed  for a summary  centralization 
index  for each  company.  Companies  were  classified as central ized  (13 
companies)  if their summary  index was  greater than  the mean  index  for all 
companies  plus one  standard  deviation.  Companies were  labeled 
decentral ized if their summary  index was  less than  the mean  index  minus 
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one  standard deviation (1  1  companies).  The  remainder were  categorized as 
moderately centralized (41  companies). 
13.  The  states are Alabama,  Colorado,  Florida,  Massachusetts,  Michigan, 
Missouri,  New  Jersey,  Ohio,  Tennessee,  Texas,  Virginia,  and Wisconsin. 
14.  Lead banks  were  excl  uded;  non-seasoned  ( short-term) affil  iates were 
not excluded. 
15.  Changing the definition of the profit variable (by including 
occupancy  costs in  expenses  or excluding furniture and equipment costs) 
did not a1  ter any  significant conclusions of the study. 
16.  As  noted above,  a  squared wage  term was  included in  preliminary runs 
and was  always  insignificant.  Thus,  it  does  not appear  in  the final form 
of the profit function estimated. 
17.  Actually,  Mull  ineaux retained a  variable proxying the imp1  icit  rate 
of  return paid on  demand  deposits.  Data  availability precluded use  of 
such a  variable in  this study. 
18.  For proof,  see  Lau  and Yotopoulos  (1972,  pp.  13-14). 
19.  Mull  ineaux  (1978,  p.  268)  reasons  that banks  in  unit banking states 
respond to branching restrictions by  operating 1  arger offices with higher 
average profi  tabil  ity.  If  bigger offices are an  imperfect substitute for 
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Best available copyadditional  offices,  banks  in  unit states 1  ikewise  should earn a  higher 
marginal  return on  offices than  banks  in states permitting branching. 
20.  The  regression  results were  virtually unchanged  when  the equation 
was  re-established with a squared wage  term  and  without the  DUMl  and  DUM2 
variables. 
21.  The  source of  these differences in efficiency (technical vs.  price) 
is not explored  in this study. 
22.  See,  for example,  Lawrence  (1971 , p.  3) and  Benston  and  Hanweck 
(1977,  p.  159). 
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In  PROF  Dependent 
Variable  ~oeff  icienta 
Intercept  1.30524 
In  WAGE 
In  OFF 







a.  -  t-Statistics are in  parentheses. 
*  Significant  at 10 percent  level,  2-tail test. 
**  Significant at 5 percent  level,  2-tail test. 
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